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    <title>Security on Jamie Craane personal blog</title>
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      <title>Operational Guardrails for Autonomous AI Agents in Production</title>
      <link>https://jamiecraane.dev/2026/30/04/reliability-engineering-in-ai-era/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;We&amp;rsquo;ve all seen the viral stories circulating on X recently: an AI coding agent runs amok and deletes a production database. Immediately, the blame game begins: users point fingers at the agent framework, at coding assistants like Cursor, or at cloud platforms like Railway.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;My take? The operator carries the responsibility. Tool vendors absolutely should ship safer defaults — scoped tokens, confirmation prompts on destructive operations, dry-run modes — and I&amp;rsquo;d happily criticize them for not doing so. But even with perfect vendor defaults, the buck stops with whoever wired the agent into production. Cursor and Railway are stand-ins here for &lt;em&gt;any&lt;/em&gt; autonomous agent with tool access; the same arguments apply to whatever framework you&amp;rsquo;re running.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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